Bangladesh's Military Drift:

Bangladesh's Military Drift: Dr Yunus Regime and India's Strategic Dilemma

Bangladesh has been moving in directions at a pace that many observers in New Delhi had not comprehended after the immediate fall of the Awami League government. Since Dr. Muhammad Yunus took over the interim administration, the behaviour of the Bangladeshi military establishment has begun to resemble patterns that older generations would recognise from the pre-1991 era. The feeling in strategic circles is almost eerie: not a new shift, but an older ghost resurfacing in a more assertive form.

The Pakistani Legacy & Bangladesh's Armed Forces

Despite the trauma of 1971, Bangladesh never fully discarded many structural habits inherited from the Pakistan Army. A significant portion of its early officer corps had trained under West Pakistani command, and several carried that institutional psychology into the new state. This contradiction, liberation from Pakistan on one hand, retention of Pakistani military culture on the other, has remained unresolved for decades. The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by mid-level officers was not just a political rupture. It pushed the military's internal worldview back toward the older West Pakistani template. Ziaur Rahman's years quietly strengthened this shift, not through overt actions but through how the armed forces began to perceive their role in the state. The military retained a subconscious leaning toward the Sunni-dominated, military-bureaucratic model of Pakistan.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Bangladesh maintained steady links with Islamic countries for defence training, Pakistan being one of them. India figured in these arrangements only when a friendly or pragmatic government was in power. Thus, for nearly half a century, Bangladesh has lived in a strange duality: economically intertwined with India, yet emotionally and strategically pulled toward Islamabad's military culture. This came at a cost to Bangladesh's own secular foundations, especially when officers responsible for Mujib's death were rewarded and celebrated.

The Yunus Administration and the Ideology of "Strategic Autonomy"

After the violent collapse of the elected Awami League government in 2024, the Yunus-led interim administration reopened this split almost immediately. His frequent references to "strategic autonomy" struck Indian policymakers as uncomfortably familiar, echoing past attempts by Dhaka to drift towards Pakistan's orbit. Under Yunus, Bangladesh has begun engaging Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan at a tempo unseen in decades. Officially, these are described as diversification efforts. In reality, they amount to a calibrated revival of the old Sunni-Islamic military network, complete with a mix of American, Turkish, and Chinese platforms that Pakistan itself uses.

Pakistan's Re-Entry: The Legacy Comes Full Circle

The first major sign came in January 2025. A six-member Bangladesh Armed Forces Division delegation, led by Lt Gen S. M. Kamrul Hasan, visited Rawalpindi and Islamabad. They met Pakistan Army Chief Gen Asim Munir, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, and others. Official statements emphasised training exchanges and staff-college slots. Analysts in India saw something deeper: discussions that likely included joint use doctrines for Turkish, Chinese, and American equipment, and perhaps intelligence coordination. ISPR's statement after the visit was telling. It framed the relationship as "resilient to external influence," a pointed jab at India's inability to restrain Dhaka's growing comfort with Pakistan.

Pakistan reciprocated quickly. Lt Gen Tabassum Habib, DG Joint Staff, arrived in Dhaka in October 2025 to a level of ceremonial protocol unseen since 1971. Reports suggested that discussions touched on logistics cooperation, intelligence sharing, officer exchange programmes, and even early ideas for defence manufacturing. The most concerning detail for Indian security circles was an ISI team's visit to Dhaka just days after Bangladesh's delegation returned from Pakistan. Publicly labelled "counter-terrorism coordination," the visit fit the classic Rawalpindi pattern: military diplomacy on the surface, intelligence penetration below it.

Pakistan's Naval Signalling in the Bay of Bengal

In November 2025, the Pakistan Navy extended this outreach to the maritime domain. PNS Saif docked at Chattogram,the first Pakistani port call there in over five decades. Its naval chief's meetings with Bangladeshi counterparts were framed as goodwill, but for Indian maritime watchers, it signalled a breach in a region traditionally stable under India's security umbrella. A Pakistani frigate tied to Chinese and Turkish strategic frameworks at Bangladesh's main port was not dismissed lightly in New Delhi.

Turkey's Role: Hardware, Ideology, and Interoperability

Pakistan may provide the legacy framework, but Turkey today provides the actual hardware and ideological packaging that enable interoperability. Bangladesh has shown interest in Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, ROKETSAN systems, ASELSAN communications suites, and Otokar vehicles, all of which are familiar to Pakistan's inventory.

Several OSINT indicators suggest Turkish advisers are already present at the Bangabandhu Defence Complex. While Bangladesh frames this as modernisation, Ankara's intent is broader: embedding a neo-Ottoman, pan-Islamic identity into South Asian military institutions. The ideological impact of this alignment may become more corrosive for India than the hardware itself.

Azerbaijan: Completing the Emerging Bloc

Azerbaijan's involvement is an extension of the Turkey-Pakistan axis. OSINT disclosures in 2025 indicated that Bangladeshi soldiers would undergo training in Turkey and Azerbaijan on the TRG-300 GMLRS system, the same system used in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This effectively inducts Bangladesh into the "Three Brothers Alliance" orbit. Bangladesh gains access to advanced missile doctrine and tactical networking. India, in turn, faces an alliance system historically critical of its interests extending into the Bay of Bengal.

Strategic Implications for India

For India, the eastern flank is entering a period of renewed complexity. The Bangladesh border, stretching over 4,000 km, runs adjacent to India's most fragile logistical and demographic zones. The Siliguri Corridor, Northeast India's internal movement grids, and border districts all depend on a stable Dhaka. That stability is no longer guaranteed. The challenge for India is multi-layered:

China is entrenching itself in Myanmar.
The US is expanding its footprint in the Bay of Bengal.
Pakistan is quietly reestablishing influence in Dhaka.
Turkey's ideological-hardware mix is reshaping the Bangladeshi officer corps.
Demographic volatility along the border remains a persistent threat.

If the situation deteriorates, India could face simultaneous external and internal disruptions. Movement of forces in the Northeast could be hindered, illegal networks could expand, and radicalisation pockets may deepen. The eastern theatre, long quiet, is becoming active again.

Policy Options for New Delhi

Strengthen the Eastern Command: India must modernise northeastern airbases, logistics nodes, and radar grids. The region's infrastructure remains behind what the new strategic reality requires.

Reassert Presence in the Bay of Bengal: Increase joint patrols with Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and key partners. India does not need escalation; only a visible presence.

Quiet Economic Signalling: Bangladesh depends on India for power, transhipment, and fuel corridors. New Delhi can convey that alignment with hostile blocs carries unavoidable costs,

4. Counter Ideological Influence: Reinforce the 1971 legacy and cultural ties with Bangladeshi society. Narratives from Pakistan and Turkey thrive only on radical Islamism, while that of India thrives on shared ancestry and cultural oneness.

Prepare for internal spillovers: Strengthen intelligence, screening mechanisms, and demographic strategies in border states. The first shocks of instability will always be felt in Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal.

Conclusion: A Shadow from 1975 Returns

More than five decades after Mujib's assassination, the mindset that enabled it appears to be resurfacing. The Yunus administration's comfort with Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan is not administrative diversification; it resembles a willing return to an older strategic instinct embedded within the Bangladeshi military. India cannot afford to be complacent, as the Bay of Bengal is no longer as predictable, and the eastern theatre is no longer dormant. New Delhi's response must be calm, precise, and grounded in long-term strategy. The lesson of 1971 was not volume, it was timing and resolve. If Bangladesh's generals continue drifting toward older alignments, India will need the same clarity it demonstrated half a century ago.